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 An Eviction in Kinnitty: Republican Social Agitation 
and the New Fianna Fáil Government, 1932-1933 
 Timothy O’Neill 
 Central Michigan University 
Abstract
 This article uses an eviction in Co. Offaly to examine the interaction between national and 
local republican politics during the first year of Fianna Fáil in power. These politics revolved 
around and revealed the internal tensions within the IRA as it attempted to develop a strategy 
to counter the new Government, and that Government’s attempt to consolidate state power, 
which necessitated resisting the desire among local republicans to settle ten-year old local scores 
from the Irish Civil War, while simultaneously consolidating the republican base at the expense 
of the IRA. 
 Keywords: Irish republicanism; land question; political parties; IRA 
Résumé
 Cet article prend l’exemple d’une expulsion dans le comté d’Offaly pour étudier les interactions 
entre les politiques locales et nationales des républicains lors de la première année au pouvoir de 
Fianna Fáil. Ces politiques révèlent les tensions internes au sein de l’IRA, qui cherchait alors à 
mettre en place une stratégie de résistance au nouveau gouvernement. Elles montrent également la 
volonté du gouvernement d’affermir le pouvoir de l’État – ce qui avait pour conséquence de ne pas 
céder au désir des militants locaux de solder dix années de querelles locales issues de la guerre civile 
tout en consolidant le soutien républicain dont il pouvait bénéficier au détriment de l’IRA. 
 Mots clés : Républicanisme irlandais ; question agraire ; partis politiques ; IRA 
 On the morning of July 19, 1932 a bailiff approached the Craven home in 
Kinnitty, Co. Offaly to serve a routine eviction notice. His first indication that 
this was not to be a routine eviction was probably when he saw the 1916 Easter 
Proclamation nailed to the door with an attached statement which in part read: 
“If a change of Government means a continued freedom for the bailiff-vulture 
and the house-wreckers, well, then, goodbye to liberty. No tribute to Britain1.” 
More problematic for the bailiff and the new Fianna Fáil Government was that 
the home was also occupied by thirty-five men of the local IRA unit who told the 
1.  Irish Independent , 20 July 1932, 7. 
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bailiff they would not surrender the house. The Kinnitty Fianna Fáil Club not 
only supported the IRA’s actions to prevent the eviction, it demanded that their 
two Fianna Fáil TDs return from Dublin to join the agitation and called upon 
the new Fianna Fáil Minister for Justice to stay the eviction2. Four months earlier 
Eamon de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party had been brought to power on the 
electoral strength of the local Fianna Fáil Clubs and local IRA units, which, at the 
local level in places such as Kinnitty, often shared a common membership3.  
 On the surface, the Kinnitty eviction appeared to represent a socially radical 
republican base directly challenging the government it had recently elected. 
Internal IRA and Fianna documents, however, reveal a somewhat more complex 
story of the Kinnitty eviction, that is, a story of internal politics within the 
IRA and Fianna Fáil. This article will use the eviction in Kinnitty to examine 
the interaction between national and local republican politics. These politics 
revolved around the internal tensions within the IRA as it attempted to develop 
a strategy to counter the new Fianna Fáil Government, and that Government’s 
attempt to consolidate state power, which necessitated resisting the nearly uni-
versal desire among local republicans to settle ten-year old local scores from the 
Irish Civil War, while simultaneously consolidating the republican base at the 
expense of the IRA. 
 Before examining the eviction in Kinnitty, however, some historical context is 
required. During the late 1920s and early 1930s the IRA leadership divided over 
the question of strategy. A group of social, or left, republicans within the IRA lea-
dership, led by Peadar O’Donnell, argued that the IRA needed to lead the masses 
in social agitation which would in turn launch a social revolution and smash the 
Free State. O’Donnell attempted to use the issue of land annuities, which the 
Cosgrave Government continued to collect and pass on to Britain, as the means 
to rally the masses. Fianna Fáil, however, successfully transformed the anti-Annui-
ties Campaign, and its revolutionary potential, into an electoral issue and rode 
the issue to power in 19324. Militarists within the IRA leadership opposed using 
the Army for social agitation. Tom Barry often spoke for this group, arguing that 
social agitation was mere politics, which was beneath the IRA, and that the IRA 
needed to focus on rebuilding the Army’s military capabilities and preparing for 
the day when it would be in a position to resume the Civil War.  
 The task of balancing these two views within the leadership rested with Moss 
Twomey, the IRA’s leader. Twomey himself was a revolutionary socialist and 
2.  Irish Press , 20 July 1932, 1. 
3.  For larger treatment of the IRA during this period see: Brian Hanley,  h e IRA 1926-1936 (Dublin), 2002; for 
Fianna Fáil, see: Richard Dunphy,  h e Making of Fianna Fail Power in Ireland, 1923-1948  (Oxford, 1995). 
4.  See: Timothy M. O’Neil, “Handing away the Trump Card? Peadar O’Donnell, Fianna Fáil and the Non-
Payment of Land Annuities Campaign, 1926-1932”,  New Hibernia Review , 12, 1 (Spring 2008), p. 19-41. 
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further to the left than most social republicans5, but preserving Army unity took 
precedence over his own politics. Twomey believed that the IRA was the Irish 
Republic and as such Army unity was paramount: “I’m if you like a fanatic in 
this matter [unity] – that I believe nothing in the country matters to Republi-
canism but the IRA6.” Against the protests of the militarists within the IRA lea-
dership, Twomey permitted the Army to move toward Left politics, but refused 
to establish an IRA political organization, which the social republicans within the 
IRA leadership desired. Nonetheless, during the late 1920s the IRA affiliated with 
the Communist International in Moscow and joined with Irish communists in 
establishing numerous Comintern front organizations in Ireland7. Such moves, 
however, failed to satisfy the social republicans who continued to agitate for an 
open IRA political organization. At the 1931 Army Convention, Twomey broke-
red a compromise that permitted the social republicans to launch an IRA – spon-
sored political program known as Saor Eire (Free Ireland). 
 By 1931 the Free State began to buckle under the pressure of a general 
republican resurgence and the global economic crisis. In October, the Cos-
grave Government responded to this threat with a two-pronged offensive. First, 
it secured a pastoral from the Church hierarchy that denounced Saor Eire and 
by implication the IRA as communistic, and then by enacting legislation that 
gave it the same emergency powers as those it had enjoyed during the Civil 
War. The attack against the IRA forced its leadership on the run while the Free 
State rounded up and imprisoned rank-and-file Volunteers. Coinciding with its 
offensive against the IRA, the Cosgrave Government called a snap election and 
attempted to portray its parliamentary opposition, that is, its Civil War republi-
can opponents de Valera and Fianna Fáil, as part of the communist conspiracy. 
Although many within the IRA leadership retained their deep suspicion of politics 
in general, and de Valera in particular, the government offensive forced a change 
in IRA electoral policy. In January 1932, the IRA leadership suspended a previous 
order that had prohibited Volunteers from either working for campaigns of from 
voting for candidates for the “illegal Free State Assembly”. The following month, 
with the important electoral support of the IRA and the land annuities issue, de 
Valera and Fianna Fáil won the election and assumed state power. 
 Upon entering office, de Valera ordered the release of all IRA prisoners and 
withheld the land annuities payments to Britain, while still collecting them from 
Irish farmers and retaining them for the Free State. Britain responded with a tariff 
5.  Uinseann MacEoin,  h e IRA in the Twilight, Years,  1923-1948 , (Dublin: Argenta, 1997), 843. 
6.  Letter from Moss Twomey to Frank Ryan, 3 March 1933, P69/185/53/177, Moss Twomey Papers University 
College Dublin Archives, henceforth cited as UCDA P69. 
7.  For a discussion of the IRA and the Comintern see: Emmet O’Connor, “Jim Larkin and the Communist Inter-
nationals, 1923-9”, Irish Historical Studies  XXXI No. 123 (May 1999), p. 357-372. 
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on Irish goods and thus began the Economic War. While Fianna Fáil’s actions 
proved wildly popular with the republican base, de Valera did not, of course, re-
proclaim the Republic, which placed the IRA in a difficult position; as Twomey 
put it: “Nobody had visualised a Free State which Republicans were not suppose 
to attack8.” De Valera’s position towards the IRA was that once Fianna Fáil had 
retained the land annuities and removed the Oath of Allegiance to the British 
Crown, the IRA needed to accept the principle of majority rule, hand over its 
arms and give allegiance to the Free State9. Needless to say, anything short of re-
restablishing the Irish Republic was unacceptable to the IRA. 
 A week after Fianna Fáil assumed power, the IRA leadership produced an 
internal document which asked and answered two essential questions: 1) can 
Fianna Fáil’s methods and policies achieve the Republic, to which it answered no, 
and 2) can the IRA launch a successful revolution against the Fianna Fáil Govern-
ment, to which it also answered no, placing the IRA’s dilemma in sharp focus. 
What then was to be done? The document reasonably concluded that the new 
situation required a political response and asked, but did not answer, the question: 
should the IRA use its military capacity in domestic issues such as supporting 
workers in strikes or preventing the eviction of small farmers10? Answering that 
question, of course, was bound to once again divide the social republicans and the 
militarists within the IRA leadership. 
 In May 1932, Tom Barry informed Twomey that he could no longer accept 
the IRA’s social program, Saor Eire, explaining: “the Army is a body with a moral 
right to make war and kill when necessary to achieve this country’s freedom, but 
I cannot accept the right of any organisation to make war to make effective their 
social programme against the wishes of the majority of the people11.” Barry added 
that  any social program made it difficult for a person of his mentality to go all 
out for the Army12. Twomey replied to Barry that the IRA needed to organize the 
people behind the Army and to achieve that objective, a social program was essen-
tial, adding that the IRA social program did indeed represent the views of the vast 
majority of the Irish people13. Two months later, Barry again wrote Twomey to 
inform him that he and de Valera had held a two-hour meeting to discuss republi-
can unity and during that meeting de Valera had offered to create a new national 
defense organization which would include the IRA14. Barry told Twomey that he 
was very much impressed by the offer and the IRA leadership should consider it. 
8.  Memorandum for IRA Envoy to Clan na nGael, 25 August 1932, UCDA P69/185/221.  
9.  IRA Memo, no title, 23 March1932, UCDA P69/53/377. 
10.  Ibid. 
11.  Letter from Tom Barry to Moss Twomey, 13 May 1932, UCDA P69/52/63. 
12.  Ibid. 
13.  Copy of letter from Moss Twomey to Tom Barry, 24 May 1932, UCDA P69/52/62. 
14.  IRA, Coni dential Report of Tom Barry’s meeting with Fianna Fáil, 17 July 1932, UCDA P69/52/55. 
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Twomey rejected the idea out of hand and believed that he had convinced Barry 
that advocating the IRA’s co-option into the Free State was a very bad idea15. 
What remained unclear to Twomey regarding the Fianna Fáil-Barry meetings was 
the extent to which Barry was freelancing or representing the militarists in the 
IRA leadership. Given Barry’s impulsiveness and narcissism, Twomey believed it 
was the former16. 
 It was in the midst of dealing with Barry’s unauthorized rapprochement 
with Fianna Fáil that Twomey learned that Seán McGuinness, a social republi-
can within the IRA leadership, had deployed Volunteers of the Offaly Battalion 
to prevent the eviction in Kinnitty. McGuinness had an impressive republican 
service record and was the stalwart of the IRA in Offaly during the Civil War17. 
He had a long history of social agitation and in 1924 wrote a memo to the IRA 
leadership arguing that the republican movement needed to be reconstructed on 
the issue of land agitation and redistribution. His memo also pointed out that in 
his area, the Irish Land Commission was only giving land to the supporters of 
the Cosgrave Government, that is members of the Cumann na nGaedheal politi-
cal party18. McGuinness was elected as a republican TD for Leix-Offaly in 1923, 
only to be given the distinction in 1925 of being the only republican TD ever 
stripped of their seat, which resulted from his conviction for physically assaulting 
a member of the Garda Síochána19. He was sentenced to 18 months’ hard labor 
but escaped and went to America20. By 1930 he had returned to Ireland, resumed 
his republican activities, and was elected to the Saor Eire executive only to be 
re-imprisoned in April 1931. When released by the Fianna Fáil Government in 
March 1932, McGuinness addressed a victory celebration to welcome home repu-
blican prisoners in Dublin’s College Green, telling the crowd that the members 
of the former Cosgrave Government were “a menace to society and the indepen-
dence of Ireland, and it behooved all Republicans to unite and wipe that menace 
out at all costs21.” 
 In May 1932 McGuinness sought Army Council authorization for his plan 
to prevent government land seizures for the nonpayment of land annuities22. To 
have authorized such a plan, of course, meant challenging Fianna Fáil. Given the 
general republican euphoria over the election of Fianna Fáil and the popularity of 
the policy to retain the land annuities, Twomey believed that at this juncture it 
15.  Ibid. 
16.  Letter from Moss Twomey to IRA O/C Cork No. 1 Brigade, 19 July 1932, UCDA P69/157/32/54. 
17.  Philip McConway, “h e Civil War in Of aly”,  Tribune (Clara, Co. Of aly), 2 January 2008, 1. 
18.  Memo from IRA O/C Leix, 8 January 1924, UCDA P69/144/89. 
19.  Irish Independent , 30 October 1931, p. 8. 
20.  Ibid. , 10 August 1929, p. 11. 
21.  Irish Times , 14 March 1932, p. 1. 
22.  Copy of letter from IRA A/G to IRA O/C Of aly Battalion, 19 May 1932, UCDA P69/157/32. 
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was dangerous to even criticize Fianna Fáil23. McGuinness and other social repu-
blicans, however, disagreed with Twomey and wanted the IRA to confront Fianna 
Fáil by demanding a moratorium on the payment of annuities by farmers to the 
Free State. Twomey contended that as long as Fianna Fáil was fighting the British 
for retention of annuities, the IRA should not “complicate the issue by advocating 
a ‘no rent’ campaign24.” The Army Council responded to McGuinness’ request by 
reminding him that he attended the meeting of the executive where his plan was 
discussed at length and rejected and then reproached him for continuing to advo-
cated such a policy in the Labour paper  Workers Voice after it had been rejected by 
his comrades on the IRA executive25. 
 Explicitly denied Army Council permission to prevent government land sei-
zures for the nonpayment of annuities, McGuinness decided to challenge Fianna 
Fáil by preventing the eviction of 76-year-old Patrick Craven and his family in 
Kinnitty. Craven had lived in the gate house of the Biddulph estate for 19 
years where he worked as the caretaker. The Land Commission took control of 
the estate and sold it to Captain Joseph Nugent, an ex-Free State Army officer. 
Nugent now sought the eviction of the Craven family from the gatehouse which 
was located on the roads which led to Nugent’s mansion26. McGuinness had 
warned Nugent not to proceed with the eviction27, while the president of the Kin-
nitty Fianna Fáil Club, Sean’s brother Patrick McGuinness28, had wired both the 
Minister for Lands and the Minister for Justice demanding that they to stop the 
eviction in Kinnitty. He received no reply29. 
 When Sean McGuinness learned that the eviction was to take place on 
morning of July 19, he dispatched Volunteers of the IRA’s Offaly Battalion 
to occupy and barricade the home in order to prevent the eviction30. Patrick 
McGuinness wired both of Offaly’s Fianna Fáil TDs, Patrick Boland and Patrick 
Gorry, demanding that they come to Kinnitty immediately and join the protest31. 
Both Boland and Gorry did arrive that morning, but not to join the agitation. 
Boland visited nearby Fianna Fáil Clubs and attempted to persuade them not to 
become involved in the Kinnitty agitation, arguing that the eviction was not the 
business of the Fianna Fáil organization32. He told a meeting of a nearby Fianna 
Fáil Club in Tullamore, that the Government was “up against bigger things than 
23.  Copy of letter from Moss Twomey to G.N. Count Plunkett, 9 April 1932, UCDA P69/52/239. 
24.  Memorandum for IRA Envoy to Clan na nGael, 25 August 1932, UCDA P69/185/221. 
25.  Copy of letter from IRA A/G to IRA O/C Of aly Battalion, 19 May 1932, UCDA P69/157/32. 
26.  Irish Times , 23 July 1932, p. 12. 
27.  Letter from Sean McGuiness to IRA A/G, 20 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/251. 
28.  Irish Independent , 8 January 1927, p. 8. 
29.  Internal IRA Report “A Kinnitty Eviction”, July 1932, UCDA P69/158/243. 
30.  Letter from Sean McGuiness to IRA A/G, 20 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/251. 
31.  Internal IRA Report “A Kinnitty Eviction”, July 1932, UCDA P69/158/243. 
32.  Irish Times , 20 July 1932, p. 5. 
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an eviction33.” The implication of the “bigger things” was confronting the British 
in the Economic War and their “imperialist agents” in Ireland – Cumann na 
nGaedheal. Minister of Justice Geoghegan replied to Patrick McGuinness that he 
had no power to stay the eviction34. TD Patrick Gorry meet with Sean McGuin-
ness at the Craven home and told him that the land belonged to Nugent, but that 
he had the sheriff agree to stay the eviction for two days so that he could negotiate 
with Nugent35. With this assurance, Sean McGuinness agreed to have the IRA 
temporarily vacate the house. Gorry returned to Dublin and meet with the Minis-
ter of Justice who, according to Gorry, assured him that the eviction would not 
take place. The following morning, however, the Craven family was evicted and 
sent to the poor house36. 
 Moss Twomey was less than pleased with the events in Kinnitty. Not only had 
McGuinness acted without consulting the Army Council, his decision to with-
draw the IRA from the house permitted Craven’s eviction and thus had embar-
rassed the IRA and damaged its reputation. Twomey asked McGuinness why he 
had trusted a Fianna Fáil TD and pointed out the obvious: Gorry had “delibera-
tely misled you37”. Regarding Twomey’s contention that his actions had damaged 
IRA’s reputation, McGuinness disagreed and argued that Craven’s eviction had 
shown the people that there was no difference between Fianna Fáil and the Cos-
grave government and the countryside was now with the IRA38. McGuinness 
launched a boycott against Captain Nugent and planned to hold weekly Sunday 
demonstrations until Craven was reinstated. He wanted Twomey to send speakers 
from Dublin for the agitation, especially Peadar O’Donnell – the greatest agita-
tor of his generation39. Twomey denied the request, telling McGuinness that it 
sounded like the agitation had a good following and it would be more effective if 
the speakers were local men, not men from Dublin40. 
 Peadar O’Donnell, of course, found his way to Kinnitty and he and the 
McGuinness brothers led the agitation. Sean McGuinness told a protest meeting 
that “in evicting Craven the Government has issued a direct challenge to the 
people, and this challenge the people are prepared to meet41.” While Patrick 
McGuinness condemned the Fianna Fáil government, the other speakers, who 
were mostly other Fianna Fáil club presidents or county councilors, had no inten-
33.  Brian Hanley,  h e IRA 1926-1936 , p. 140. 
34.  Irish Independent , 20 July 1932, p. 7. 
35.  Letter from Sean McGuiness to IRA A/G, 20 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/251. 
36.  Internal IRA Report “A Kinnitty Eviction”, July 1932, UCDA P69/158/243. 
37.  Memo RE: Kinnitty Eviction from Moss Twomey to IRA O/C Of aly Battalion, 27 July 1932, UCDA 
P69/158/245. 
38.  Letter from Sean McGuiness to IRA A/G, 25 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/246. 
39.  Ibid. 
40.  Copy of memo from IRA A/G to IRA O/C Of aly Battalion, 28 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/243. 
41.  Irish Times , 23 July 1932, p. 7.  
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tion of challenging the Fianna Fáil Government. In fact, most of the local repu-
blican speakers refused to even criticize the Fianna Fáil Government. According 
to James Garvin of the Co. Offaly Council, “he did not come here to criticize 
the Fianna Fáil Government. He was a ‘wholehogger’ for its policy but if there 
was a law which permitted the eviction of Craven and his family it should be 
changed42.” John Finn, another Fianna Fáil county councilor, went even further, 
explaining that “the law which permitted the eviction had not been made by the 
present government. This government has been obstructed and has not got a 
chance to work43”. Such statements, of course, conflicted with Sean McGuinness’ 
reports to the Army Council that the eviction had shown the people of Offaly 
that there was no difference between Fianna Fáil and the Cosgrave government. 
Indeed, nearly all of the local republican speakers dissociated the eviction from 
the Fianna Fáil Government, instead focusing on Joseph Nugent, the man who 
had evicted the Cravens, denouncing him as the ex Free State Army officer who 
had been rewarded by Cumann na nGaedheal for his treason against the Irish 
Republic – a man, as it was frequently mentioned, who was from the County 
Clare44. This inference, perhaps, was that Nugent was not native to Offaly and 
therefore in addition to his treason, he was a “land grabber” who had no ancestral 
right to the land.  
 According to newspaper accounts, the demonstrations in Kinnitty drew large 
crowds from surrounding counties but failed to reinstate the Craven family. The 
demonstrations did, however, raise enough money to build a wooden hut for the 
Cravens, with a kitchen and two rooms, on property near their former home45. 
During the agitation, Twomey repeatedly asked McGuinness on what terms did 
Craven hold the house and what was the reason for his eviction46. McGuinness 
never answered those questions and it appears that Craven had no legal right to 
the house. It also appears that the attempt to prevent the eviction and the agi-
tation that followed had far more to do with his evictor, Captain Nugent, than 
with Craven’s claim to the house, or even Craven himself. As McGuinness put 
it, “Craven – an old man – was never much of an asset to the independence 
movement. It was not so much in his favour [we acted] as it was to get a crack at 
Nugent and the system he represents47”. It was also rumored that Nugent had exe-
cuted republican prisoners during the Civil War. The IRA’s C/O for East Clare, 
42.  Ibid. , 26 July 1932, 5. 
43.  Ibid. 
44.  Irish Times , 23 July 1932, p. 12 
45.  Irish Independent , 1 August 1932, p. 10. 
46.  Memo RE: Kinnitty Eviction from Moss Twomey to IRA O/C Of aly Battalion, 27 July 1932, UCDA 
P69/158/245. 
47.  Letter from Sean McGuiness to IRA A/G, 20 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/251. 
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however, could not confirm that accusation, only that while drunk Nugent had 
beaten and threatened to shoot republican prisoners during the Civil War48.  
 The statement that McGuinness nailed to the door of the Craven home des-
cribed the evictor as: “A ex-Free State Army Captain named Joe Nugent, who was 
presented with a large farm and mansion thereon by the Cosgrave Murder gang 
for service rendered with the King’s Irish mercenaries during the 1922-3 struggle 
that was created by the British with a backing renegade and traitor Irishmen49.” 
While Craven appears to have held no legal claim to the property, in the minds 
of the McGuinness brothers and many local republicans in Kinnitty, Nugent’s 
claim to the property was based on his treason to the Irish Republic. As Sean 
McGuinness put it, they were acting against “Nugent and the system he repre-
sents50”. That system was translated at the local level with the material rewards of 
state power as the victors of the Civil War, Cumann na nGaedheal, used the Irish 
Land Commission to reward its supporters with land. Indeed, under the Cosgrave 
Government it was rare for someone to receive land if he was not a member of a 
local Cumann na nGaedheal Club51.  
 All politics is local, of course, and in Ireland even more so. Offaly had long 
been contested space between Republicans and the supporters of Cumann na 
nGaedheal. The five-seat constituency of Leix-Offaly repeatedly split between the 
anti-Treaty and pro-Treaty parties with Labour taking the fifth seat. It had been 
the home constituency of Kevin O’Higgins, the man in the Cosgrave Govern-
ment whom republicans detested the most and held mainly responsible for the 
execution of Republican prisoners during the Civil War and considered the 
strongman behind the Cosgrave Government. After his unauthorized assassina-
tion by members of the IRA in 1927, his brother Thomas O’Higgins took one of 
the Cumann na nGaedheal seats in Leix-Offaly. Thomas O’Higgins founded the 
Blueshirts, Ireland’s proto-fascist movement, and in doing so cited the IRA’s pre-
vention of the Kinnitty eviction as one of the reasons why such a movement was 
necessary52.  
 Twomey’s strategy to counter Fianna Fáil did not rest with land agitation, 
because he believed de Valera, unlike the Cosgrave government, would use the 
resources of the state to purchase the agitators. In Twomey’s words, “Fianna Fáil 
can buy off most of the farmers who are agitating today; they are in a position 
to make concessions, including moratoriums53.” Twomey’s position on land agita-
48.  Copy of memo from IRA D/I to IRA O/C Of aly Battalion, 28 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/244. 
49.  Copy of proclamation of those occupying Craven house, ca. 19 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/257. 
50.  Letter from Sean McGuinness to IRA A/G, 20 July 1932, UCDA P69/158/251. 
51.  Terence Dooley, “Land and politics in independent Ireland, 1923-1948: the case for reappraisal”, Irish Histori-
cal Studies, XXXIV, n° 134 (november 2004), p. 185. 
52.  Meath Chronicle , 27 August 1932, 8. 
53.  Letter from Moss Twomey to Sean Lennon, 6 August 1932, UCDA P69/52/2. 
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tion during this period is best illustrated by his response to contemporary events 
in Co. Tipperary, where local republicans reported that “as a result of the failure 
to divide the land and give it to Republicans […] a very strong anti-Fianna Fáil 
feeling has developed54.” This report, of course, mirrored McGuinness’s reports 
from Kinnitty. Volunteer Ned O’Reilly argued that these aggrieved republi-
cans would join the IRA if it established an organization to lead the agitation55. 
The IRA’s Tipperary O/C, however, did not share O’Reilly’s opinion56. Twomey 
was cautious believing that such agitation could be seen as anti-Fianna Fáil, and 
asserted: “Our [IRA] position is that while we cannot very well put ourselves at 
the head of the agitation for the distribution of land, we certainly should not 
oppose it. On the contrary we should do everything we can to have as many of 
our people as possible fixed up57.” When ex-Volunteers, who were also members 
of Fianna Fáil, launched such an organization and claimed to have done so to 
support the IRA, the IRA put an end to it, telling them that while the IRA had 
no objections to local agitation on the part of active Volunteers or ex-Volunteers 
to secure land, it would not tolerate the formation of an organization to conduct 
the agitation58.  
 While Twomey rejected land agitation as the IRA’s strategy to counter Fianna 
Fáil, he clearly was “in favour of Volunteers, and even ex-Volunteers, getting jobs 
and land in preference to the enemies of the Republic59.” This was a ten-year old 
objective of all republicans. He warned, however, that Fianna Fáil would give a 
preference to ex-Volunteers, not active Volunteers and that de Valera would use 
land distribution in his effort to co-opt active Volunteers into the Free State60. 
Thus, Twomey’s opposition to agrarian agitation, in addition to his fears that 
it would divide the IRA leadership, was also rooted in his fear that Fianna Fáil 
would use its state power to numerically weaken the IRA with the reward of land. 
His response to the agitation in Tipperary, although no IRA units were involved 
as was the case in Kinnitty, is instructive. He once again demonstrated his aver-
sion to directly challenging Fianna Fáil, which he believed would be seen by the 
republican base as weakening Fianna Fáil and by implication assisting the “Cos-
grave Murder Gang.” During this period, the IRA outlined its position regarding 
Fianna Fáil in a dispatch to the United States: “We cannot afford to be put in a 
54.  Letter from Moss Twomey to Jack Jones, 1 October 1932, UCDA P69/54/34. 
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position of appearing to help the Imperialists [Cumann na nGaedheal], or of wea-
kening Fianna Fáil against them61.”  
 Rank-and-file Fianna Fáil TDs, behind closed doors, challenged their Govern-
ment’s position regarding the IRA, land distribution and its failure to punish 
their Civil War enemies. The Minutes of the Fianna Fáil Parliamentary Party 
reveal that many of the party’s supporters and backbenchers wanted the suppor-
ters of Cumann na nGaedheal punished and republicans rewarded – especially 
IRA Volunteers. During a weekly meeting of Fianna Fáil TDs in July of 1932, 
John Flynn moved to give IRA men preference on public works, but withdrew 
his motion on the instance of de Valera who asserted that Volunteers would 
receive “all possible consideration62”. Even though Fianna Fáil had secured an 
absolute majority in the January 1933 General Election, many TDs contended 
that the majority would have been even larger if it was not for the Land Com-
mission’s unjust treatment of local republicans in the distribution of land63. As 
such, “a complete revolution of the Land Commission was demanded and that 
special attention should be given to the IRA in the distribution of land64”. De 
Valera rejected this demand, as well as demands to establish a tribunal to try indi-
viduals for crimes against republicans during the Civil War, by arguing for “the 
necessity of closing finally the chapter of the Civil War in Ireland65”. While de 
Valera successfully resisted demands from his republican base to settle ten-year old 
scores against their Civil War enemies, he was forced to accept the principle that 
his Government needed to consult the party before enacting policy that would 
change the “economic outlook” of the Fianna Fáil movement66. When Fianna Fáil 
consolidated state power, the Land Commission became an instrument to reward 
loyal party supporters with land, just as Cumann na nGaedheal had used it to 
reward its supporters67. De Valera used state employment, pensions and land dis-
tribution to convert active Volunteers into ex-Volunteers, just as Twomey had 
warned. Republican Marie Comerford later described such largess as “Fianna Fáil 
bribery68”. 
 Even though de Valera and his Fianna Fáil Government resisted the 
demands from the republican base to punish individual members of Cumann 
na nGaedheal, their retention of the land annuities and the ensuing Economic 
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War and protectionism exacted a collective punishment as the price of cattle was 
nearly cut in half between 1932 and 193569. This reduction hit large ranchers the 
hardest, that is to say, the supporters of Cumann na nGaedheal. When de Valera 
refused to punish individual opponents, such as Joseph Nugent, it was challenged 
by many republicans; both within the IRA and Fianna Fáil, but the overwhel-
ming majority of republicans had no other option than Fianna Fáil. The deep 
social, political, cultural and economic division within Irish society produced by 
the Civil War created such an environment that by 1932 even the most radical 
republican hesitated to criticize Fianna Fáil, fearing that to do so would be tanta-
mount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy, that is, to Cumann na nGaedheal. 
This was evident in Kinnitty. During the agitation, the McGuinness brothers 
had warned Fianna Fáil that it would be punished by republicans for its failure 
to support Craven70. When a General Election arrived six months later in January 
1933, their threats proved empty. In the constituency of Leix-Offaly, Fianna Fáil 
increased its share of polls by 3% and while TD Patrick Gorry failed to win ree-
lection, another Fianna Fáil TD took his seat71. 
 While the McGuinness brothers and O’Donnell led demonstrations of a few 
hundred in Kinnitty, de Valera addressed a rally that numbered 30,000 in Dublin 
as the Economic War with Britain intensified72. As the republican base became 
increasing radicalized by the anti-British rhetoric, and as Fianna Fáil successfully 
framed a financial and tariff dispute as an “Economic War”, Twomey saw an 
opportunity for the IRA to challenge Fianna Fáil’s leadership in the new struggle 
with Britain. In the autumn of 1932, the IRA launched the Boycott British 
League which attempted to convince people in Ireland to stop purchasing British 
made goods. When this failed – apparently people in Ireland actually liked some 
British goods – the League attempted to enforce the boycott which quickly dege-
nerated into a series of stunts as IRA units traveled the country smashing bottles 
of Bass Ale and boxes of Cadbury Chocolates. Such campaigns, of course, could 
not rebuild the revolutionary republican movement nor challenge Fianna Fáil for 
the hearts and minds of the republican base. Unlike the agrarian agitation of the 
Kinnitty eviction, however, the Boycott British League did assist Twomey in his 
main goal of maintaining Army unity as it was supported by both the social repu-
blicans and the militarists; indeed, both Sean McGuinness and Tom Barry eagerly 
joined the campaign.  
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 In September 1932, George Gilmore, perhaps the deepest thinker among the 
social republicans within the IRA leadership, wrote to Twomey: 
 I do not agree with Peadar O’Donnell in his belief that there is a re-
volutionary situation in the country only waiting for someone to assume 
leadership. On the contrary, I believe that particularly all the republican 
and anti Free State feeling in the country is hopelessly pro-Dev., and that 
Fianna Fail are going to hold the i eld for a very long time to come, and 
I do not see how anything we could have done for the past 6 months 
would have altered that73.  
 Gilmore’s analysis proved prophetic, although one suspects that Gilmore did 
not imagine that Fianna Fáil would remain Ireland’s largest political party for 
nearly 80 years. Fianna Fáil’s ascension to state power presented the IRA lea-
dership with a problem for which it never found an answer; perhaps it never really 
understood the question, perhaps there was no answer as Gilmore suggested. 
Twomey and others within the IRA wondered if their hatred of the “Cosgrave 
Murder Gang” would lead to their demise at the hands of Fianna Fáil: “Some 
of us have a feeling that Fianna Fáil know we are so much opposed to the late 
Imperial gang that we would go a long way to end their power for all time. They 
wonder could they exploit that opposition to the point of abolishing ourselves74!” 
The evidence suggests yes. Their mutual defeat in Civil War and the resulting 
deep mutual hated of the Cosgrave regime and its supporters had bound all repu-
blicans together. From Fianna Fáil’s formation in 1926 to its ascension to state 
power in 1932, most republicans saw no inconsistency in supporting both the 
IRA and Fianna Fáil. Once in power, of course, the former “slightly constitutio-
nal party” became fully constitutional and republicans, such as those in Kinnitty, 
were now forced to choose between the IRA and its revolutionary republicanism 
or Fianna Fáil’s constitutional republicanism, which was now sweetened with the 
material and psychological rewards of state power, that is, a republicanism that 
could cut your land annuity payments in half and control the Land Commission’s 
distribution of land. Subsequent election results suggest that for the overwhel-
ming majority of republicans this was not a difficult choice.  
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